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INTRODUCTION
TRIAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE:
THE EVOLUTION OF A FIELD OF
STUDY

FRANK MUNGER

This Special Issue of the Law & Society Review on longitudinal studies of trial courts represents the combined efforts of
twenty-three scholars from many disciplines and methodological
perspectives to assess the goals, achievements, problems, and potential of this research. 1 Work in this field is rapidly evolving beyond descriptive docket studies of trial courts, and is driven by engagement with theory and research on dispute resolution, legal
culture, complex organizations, and the state. The Special Issue
aspires to acquaint readers with the state of the art of this research and, at the same time, to break new ground that will
change future work. To help the reader assess its achievements
and its potential, the issue contains current research, constructive
criticism of longitudinal research on trial courts, and, above all,
discussion and illustrations of a broad range of potential theoretical foundations for future research.
The Special Issue extends the series of issues of the Law & Society Review on litigation and dispute processing (1974, 1975,
1980-81, 1985). The appearance of this Special Issue, like those
that preceded it, marks important growth. Interest in trial courts
as sites for longitudinal research on the role of law and legal instiI am grateful to all of the participants in the Conference on Longitudinal
Research on Trial Courts and to the contributors to this Special Issue for the
extraordinary pleasure of working with them, for their help and cooperation
in making this collaborative project possible, but most of all for what I have
learned from them as colleagues and friends. Some of what I think I have
learned is expressed in this brief introduction and in the Afterword. For
assistance in composing both of my contributions to this issue I would especially like to thank Jim Atleson, Shari Diamond, David Engel, Felice Levine,
Jack Schlegel, and Carroll Seron.
1 As I acknowledge at the end of this essay, the articles and comments in
this issue are edited versions of papers and comments presented at a conference on longitudinal research on trial courts held at the State University of
New York at Buffalo in August 1987. The conference was supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-8512625, and this Special Issue of the
Law & Society Review was made possible through a supplementary grant SES8843466. The conference was organized specifically for the purposes of assessing this field of research and providing an opportunity for reflection and exchange about the contents of many of these papers.
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tutions in modem developed countries now ranges widely across
disciplinary boundaries and perspectives. In this introduction I
will describe and examine the significance of this expansion of interest and research activity.
The body of research has grown not only in size but also in its
potential importance for understanding fundamental issues of law
and change. Work on dispute processing, litigation, and trial
courts has addressed processes that we know occur over time, such
as conflict, the social construction of legal culture, and litigation.
Yet, it has been relatively rare for such research to incorporate the
dimension of time. Because longitudinal study of trial courts is
fundamentally about change over time, it has the potential to
probe deeply into some of the most basic issues in the law and society field--change, resistance to change, the evolution of conflict
and difference, and competition for power to control conflict and
difference.
While interest in longitudinal research has grown, critics (including me and others who have put substantial effort into such
research) have argued that its contribution to understanding fundamental issues of law and change has been limited. The contributions to date of the most conamron type of longitudinal trial court
research, the docket study, is an important topic, one to which the
first group of essays in this volume turn (Friedman, 1990; Sanders,
1990). There is, undoubtedly, a large gap between what longitudinal research on trial courts might potentially achieve and what it
has already accomplished. A principal motivation for this special
issue, therefore, and a major influence on its contents, has been assessment of the difficulties the research has experienced and development of ways to employ longitudinal trial court studies to examine previously unexplored but potentially important issues that
arise in the context of change over time in and around trial courts.
Among the issues identified by constructive critics of longitudinal trial court research, the most compelling has been the need
for theory that will help formulate important, insightful, and interesting questions. Docket research has sometimes been described as insufficiently engaged with ideas and as atheoretical. I
argue later in this introduction that this has never been true,
although the research in its early stages was inspired by an extremely narrow theoretical perspective and by correspondingly
broad inferences from docket data that were used to support the
theory. Consequently, a key to development of the field is a better
theoretical foundation for the research. The evolution of longitudinal trial court studies reflected in this Special Issue may be measured by its sharper focus on fundamental theoretical issues and
consequent movement toward data and methods of research appropriate to those issues.
As Special Editor for this issue I have been particularly aware
of the need to strengthen the theory underlying longitudinal trial
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court studies, and thus the collection, above all, illustrates particularly promising uses of theory. Two important benefits have been
derived from the attention given in the essays to the theoretical
development of the field. First, there is, in these essays, greater
utilization of the broad range of available theories that might usefully be applied to longitudinal trial court studies. Many of these
theories have been drawn from work in closely related fields of
law and society research. The application of such theories could
prove useful to those working in the related fields as well as
broadening and enriching longitudinal trial court research. In this
Special Issue, the theories applied to longitudinal trial courts range
across the full spectrum of perspectives in current law and society
research, including among others, perspectives derived from dispute resolution, studies of culture and difference, research on complex organizations, theory of the state, and law and economics.
Second, and a point underscored by the recent discussions of the
theory and method of social science in the law and society field,
different perspectives on research entail asking fundamentally different questions, employing different data, and drawing inferences
by means of different methods of data analysis. While the contributions to this Special Issue that discuss or illustrate the implications of these different perspectives for longitudinal trial court research may not resolve the basic social science issues that have
moved the wider discussion (for example, the value of formal theory), the reader will have an opportunity to compare on a common
ground the points of convergence and difference, the strengths and
weaknesses, of the theories and methodologies of the different perspectives themselves.
ORIGINS
Theories of law and social change have their roots in nineteenth-century European social theory (Krislov, 1983; Daniels,
1984; Munger 1988). Various strands of nineteenth-century social
theory are linked to implicit or explicit programs of social change
(Giddens, 1971; Rule 1978). Specifically, the Durkheimian and
Weberian strands that gave rise to modernization theory, and
which in turn influenced American research on law and social
change, focused on the function of public institutions in reducing
or controlling the private conflict that arose from the industrialization and bureaucratization of modern society. In helping to perform this function, courts are said to facilitate the realization of
values underlying the social ordering of society (Durkheim, 1964a;
Weber, 1967). Thus law reflects society, specifically its culture (see
Friedman, 1985).
James Willard Hurst provided an important bridge between
this theoretical tradition and contemporary research on law and
society (1956, 1964). At the core of his enormously influential
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work on the impact of economic development on legal institutions
in North America is a firm grasp of this theory. In Hurst's economic, social, and legal history of the Wisconsin lumber industry,
as in his other works, law is described as a repository of community values. Actors facing conflict created by disruption of the social order during economic development turned to law to help
them maintain the continuity of that order (see Munger, 1988:
60-61).2
Research on trial courts has been strongly influenced by this
tradition in nineteenth-century social theory and its reflection in
American legal history. In particular, a paper delivered by Jos6
Juan Toharia at Bielefeld, West Germany, in 1973 had a great impact on the theoretical development of North American caseload
studies by describing the following empirical paradox in terms of
modernization theory (1976). Toharia's Spanish data showed that
while economic development had led to increasing resort to law to
help order private relations, the quantity of litigation had not followed a similar pattern, initially rising with economic takeoff but
eventually declining even though economic development continued.3 Thus, on the basis of Toharia's research, the relationship between economic modernization and litigation appeared to be curvilinear rather than linear. Toharia's paper on trial court litigation
inspired a highly influential study of two California trial courts by
2 Hurst's careful historiography has always been broader than his theory.
In contrast to his main theoretical framework, he acknowledges that factors
other than law are at work in social change, and this acknowledgment, together with his detailed description of the litigants, their economic interests,
and the manipulation of law to serve particular interests (often an implicit
rather than an explicit theme), suggests new lines of theoretical development
for research on law and social change. One might thus say that there is an
invitation to look more deeply at the marginality of the law, at the inequalities
of power among litigants, and at the state. These themes have yet to be developed fully in research on law and social change.
3 Examination of the relationship of law to social change might have been
pursued from these beginnings along many different lines of theoretical development, for example, by examining the apparently increasing dependence of
private transactions on legal forms or the changing social construction of actor
choices in conflict resolution in different cultures. It is interesting, for example, that none of the essays inspired by Toharia's work that appeared in the
1974 issue of the Review made the obvious connection between Toharia's research and the article by Marc Galanter that appeared in the same Special Issue on the Review (1974) on the impact of inequalities in resources and power
on litigation.
Yet from one perspective it is not surprising that it was the impact of social change on the frequency of litigation that in fact received further attention. Of course, the availability of docket data was important. But another explanation seems equally important. Early longitudinal research on trial courts
suggested that there was a connection between social conflict and the behavior
of courts. These studies were conducted at a point in U.S. political history (the
mid-1970s) when a similar connection was being made in policy debates about
the appropriate role of courts in public and private conflict (see Burger, 1970).
That the policy debates were being driven by political retrenchment following
a period judicial and social activism, and thus were not motivated by concern
for the courts themselves, seems to have been lost in the tidal wave of studies
of court "overload" and "litigation explosion." (Compare Galanter, 1979.)
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Friedman and Percival (1976a). Employing the hypothesis suggested by Toharia's paper and a historical perspective on courts
from Hurst, Friedman and Percival's longitudinal analysis of trial
court docket data offered a theory to support the curvilinear relationship between modernization and litigation. They argued that
long-term trends in litigation were shaped by both the rise in conflict accompanying economic development and the subsequent routinization of social relations following change. In their view, longterm litigation trends thus reflected closely the need for dispute
resolution in society.
Friedman and Percival's path-breaking essay virtually defined
the field of longitudinal trial court research in its early stages and
thus encouraged both the field's methodological emphasis on
docket data and its theoretical orientation to the effects of economic development on litigation. Over the past fifteen years, studies of longitudinal trends in the activities of trial courts have proliferated. The body of data on trial courts now available to the
research community is large and growing, and includes docket data
series for substantial periods from trial courts in most of Western
Europe, Japan, a representative sample of Latin American countries and a half-dozen states, in addition to data kept by the National Center for State Courts on recent trends in North American
state courts (see Ietswaart, 1990; Clark, 1990; Wollschliger, 1989;
Giles and Lancaster, 1989; National Center for State Courts, 1984;
and generally Friedman, 1983; 1989b). Indeed, measured by their
visibility in policy debates, the level of funding, or the interest in
descriptive accounts of court activity of the past, studies of trial
courts, in particular statistical research on caseloads, are increasing
in importance (Galanter, 1983a, 1986b; Daniels, 1990; Nelson,
1988b). Yet the criticism is often made, both within and outside
the field, that longitudinal research on trial courts has remained
largely dependent on docket data and has been slow to develop beyond its Durkheimian roots. In this view, the research has not yet
lived up to its promise to provide new insights into the emergence
and maintenance of legal institutions and a fresh approach to the
study of law and social change.
GETTING BEYOND DOCKET STUDIES
Many critics have suggested that the slow fruition of longitudinal studies of trial courts is attributable to methodological obstacles. For example, critics have pointed to the gap between concepts of change that drive the research and the actual measures of
change yielded by docket data, errors in inference from docket
data, and even problems in employing basic statistical research
methods (Cartwright, 1975; Lempert, 1978; Krislov, 1983; Daniels,
1984; Munger, 1988). While these problems are certainly evident in
longitudinal trial court research, the field is not unique in this re-
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spect. Other critics have suggested that the real problems lie
deeper. For these critics, problems in the operationalization and
measurement of change in the "economy," the measurement and
interpretation of rates of litigation, and of the operationalization of
other concepts critical to the research reflect weaknesses of conceptualization and theory as well as poor methodology. While all
researchers acknowledge that there may be better ways to operationalize and measure some processes of change, these critics nevertheless have suggested that more imaginative theoretical development and greater precision in thinking about those processes
must precede development of research strategies (Engel, 1980;
Krislov, 1983; Munger, 1988). Lack of theoretical development of
the field may explain why, even after many years of labor, the
body of published longitudinal research on trial courts is limited
largely to basic profiles of change in the quantity of litigation, and
the relationships between litigation and such potential correlates
as industrialization, urbanization, changing patterns of wealth,
political conflict, court capacity, or new law have yet to be systematically and imaginatively mined and examined.
There may be significant reasons for the multiple problems of
longitudinal trial court research that have hindered its development. The practical and methodological problems of the research
are difficult ones. Even the simplest longitudinal study is hard and
expensive work. 4 Time and money are, however, not the only determinants of the reach of longitudinal research on trial courts.
Ironically, the very success of caseload research in contributing to
policy discussions or in aiding the description of an unexplored
past may have retarded the development of research that could
have made more significant theoretical contributions. Indeed,
there may be no better illustration of the "pull of the policy audience" than the repeated citation of the litigation explosion hy4 What- is most interesting about these shortcomings is that they have
been identified repeatedly by those within as well as those outside the field.
This suggests that the conceptual and methodological problems of the field are
difficult. Court dockets may have at first appeared to represent an accessible
and easily understood measure of the relationship between law and social
change. Yet we are a long way beyond thinking that docket data are to be easily understood, for docket data represent conflict and conflict resolution twice
reflected, once by the social construction of disputing by parties, and once
again by the construction of a "case" by the court system itself. Thus, in addition to the usual difficulties of archival research, docket data present difficult
problems of inference about the processes of central interest. At the same
time it should be remembered that this is not the only field of empirical study
that presents such challenging problems for data analysis. Nor in my view are
these even the chief problems of the field, as I explain below.
5 In an extended comment on research about law and society Sarat and
Silbey (1988) have argued that research representative of the mainstream of
the field has been influenced by the assumptions which underlie legal ideology. This, they contend, is evidenced by the focus of research on one of two
projects: attempting to verify those assumptions or attempting to undermine
them. In either event, the topics and issues for this research are dictated by
the assumptions of legal ideology, and thus reflect "the pull of the policy audi-
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pothesis as justification for reviewing existing data on caseloads or
for amassing yet another longitudinal data set to confirm or refute
theories that have emerged from contemporary debate about the
relationship between modern culture and change (see, e.g., Galanter, 1983a; 1984; National Center for State Courts, 1984; Ietswaart, 1990). Similarly, the importance of describing the past activity of the courts for purposes of understanding baseline
phenomena, quite apart from one's analytic interest in the significance of the patterns in the past, may have encouraged somewhat
repetitive research that avoided making broader theoretical contributions.
RESISTANCE TO THEORY
A more fundamental problem is also apparent. Challenges to
the concepts and theory used by longitudinal research raise questions about perspective that deeply divide social science. The failure of this area of study to reach its full potential thus may reflect
issues broadly affecting law and society research. Few recent studies of law and society consider processes occurring over timewhether maintenance of continuity and order, long-term processes
of change, incremental change, or longitudinal comparisons between communities or between societies (see Sarat, 1985). Why
has interest in law and social change apparently declined? "Modernization" theory still leaves a bad taste in the mouths of many
(compare Trubek and Galanter, 1974). Further, modern Marxian
theory, evolving rapidly since the early 1970s, has constructed increasingly ambiguous roles for law (see Thompson, 1975; Sugarman, 1983). Finally, research has increasingly been directed to
small-scale social organization, a trend that fits well with the current interest in studying the construction of meaning (Geertz,
1973; Sarat and Felstiner, 1986) and in studying power from the
ground up (Foucault, 1979; Yngvesson, 1982, 1988). Thus, the contemporary emergence of conflicting, yet incompletely articulated,
paradigms for empirical research on law has made researchers cautious about formulating tentative generalizations of the kind longitudinal research invites (and even requires) in order to focus data
collection and analysis. The sharpness of these differences (only
partly interdisciplinary) has, in my view, made investigators cautious theoreticians. Progress has been slow in part because research carries the burden, in this as well as other areas of law and
society research, not only of meeting the challenge of data analysis
but also of reconciling the different perspectives on social science
6
to which investigators themselves are drawn.
ence" to the exclusion of perspectives which favor assumptions that do not accord with the official view of the legal system.
6 Expressions of criticism and doubt about the field of study have often
begun by examining the units of analysis that docket studies have often taken
for granted: "case," "court," and "dispute." Significantly, it is to this question
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CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE FIELD
Because these differences in perspective are important in law
and society research, it is perhaps not surprising that criticism of
longitudinal trial court caseload research has undervalued both the
achievements and the potential of the field. Caseload studies,
though they represent only one type of longitudinal research, have
already been quite important for our understanding of law in society. First, such studies represent one of the few subfields of law
and society research that is systematically studying links between
law and social change. Second, caseload studies have added to the
range of historical experience on which we can draw to test our
ideas (Hurst, 1959, 1980-81). Third, this body of research highlights
the importance of inequality and of power in determining the use
and impact of legal resources, particularly the ability of litigants
with substantial power and longevity, such as organizations, to mediate the effects of law over long periods (Kagan, 1984;' McIntosh,
1985; Munger, 1986a, 1988; Stookey, 1990). Finally, longitudinal research on trial courts provides compelling evidence that the courts
themselves, and the state of which they are a part, are actors that
compete with other normative systems and dispute-resolution
processes.
In addition to these positive achievements and notwithstanding the rudimentary stage of their development, longitudinal studies of trial courts have established the inadequacies of existing theories about the role of courts and the nature of litigation. Here
research has enabled rejection of the public perception of a rising
litigation trend (Galanter, 1983a) and of the hypothesis that there
exists a simple linear (or curvilinear) relationship between change
and litigation (McIntosh, 1983; Daniels, 1984; Munger, 1988; Clark,
1990). In addition, the discussion of caseloads in historical perspective has also contributed to reassessment of ideas about the close
relationship between cases, disputes, and conflict (Engel, 1980;
Kidder, 1980-81). These hypotheses, now questioned or rejected as
starting points for research, appear naive only in retrospect and
served a valuable purpose opening the way to much broader issues
(Trubek, 1980-81a).

that investigators, as critics of the field, have directed much of their own introspection. Yet, addressing the criticism of the concepts employed in research by
adopting a more theoretically defined unit of analysis presents another dilemma, namely, focused theory; indeed the use of any theory at all highlights
sharp differences in perspective. There are no "natural" units of analysis;
there are no questions to address that do not raise problems of perspective
that deeply divide the research community (Abel, 1980). The presence of
these differences in starting points creates an opportunity for comparison of
contrasting approaches to specific questions (Nelson 1988b), but they may also
divide trial court research along disciplinary or political lines.
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ASSESSMENT
Longitudinal research on trial courts is demonstrating its potential by slowly evolving into sophisticated research about social
change. Progress in this direction has been made by employing
theoretical perspectives that encompass more of the worlds beyond
the court and within the court by, for example, looking closely at
changes in the culture and social organization of conflict and disputes, or tracing the effects of changes in the professionalization of
prosecutors or judges, or considering the impact of political economy on the administration and financing of courts, to name but a
few of the new approaches (and see Boyum and Mather's (1983)
important earlier attempt to encourage theoretical development of
court research). As further longitudinal research has revealed the
complexity of the connections between trial courts and social
change, it has contributed to the recognition that the deeper roots
of legal change often lie in the intertwining of many related social
changes both within and outside of courts (see, e.g., Friedman,
1985; Upham, 1987).
Not surprisingly, these advances in our understanding of disputing, litigation, and courts have led to calls for more contextualized study of courts and for research that relies less on docket data
and more on information bearing specifically on the actors and
processes identified as significant. And equally not surprisingly,
the call for a more contextualized study of courts compounds
rather than simplifies the difficult theoretical and methodological
problems of the field. Given that problems are thus soon to be still
more difficult and that criticism of existing work continues as that
work yields significant achievements, the time seems ripe for an
assessment of the value of longitudinal trial court research. The
essays that follow are an effort to contribute to that assessment.
THE SPECIAL ISSUE
This Special Issue of the Law & Society Review on longitudinal research on trial courts is divided into four parts. In the first,
two essays provide both positive and critical assessments of the development of longitudinal research on trial courts. The second
part presents some of the best recent longitudinal research based
on trial court docket data, together with comments by investigators experienced in trial court research who attempt to define
more precisely the limits of this kind of longitudinal study by
drawing on their own research experiences. Part III presents a
rich assortment of theoretical starting points for longitudinal research on trial courts, including development of the disputeprocessing paradigm; theorizing about complex organizations, the
state, and the economy, and the social construction of meaning. In
part IV, principal investigators from two major international comparative research projects on trial courts discuss the problems of
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comparative research and means of overcoming them that are
broadly applicable to research on legal institutions and dispute
processing in various communities.
Prior to writing the last drafts of the essays appearing in this
Special Issue, the authors assembled, with others, at a conference
supported by the National Science Foundation, at the State University of New York at Buffalo in August 1987. The purpose of the
conference was to enrich individual assessments of the field of
study, to invite broader theoretical horizons for ongoing and future
work, and to encourage, if possible, collaborative research, all
through discussion of the field by scholars representing a broad
cross-section of perspectives on social science and law. While an
important result of the conference was to contribute to achievement of those goals in the work of those attending, its primary
purpose was to share that progress with others. Thus, this issue itself represents a collaborative undertaking intended to contribute
to the development of research on trial courts and social change, as
well as to a better understanding of issues that cross boundaries of
disciplines and perspectives more generally in law and society research.
I recognize that many others in the law and society field are
doing work that enriches the longitudinal study of trial courts
either directly or indirectly. A special issue of this kind cannot be
more than a "sample" of work and ideas in a particular research
area; thus, the other authors and I are indebted to all who have
advanced our understanding of trial courts over time. As the numerous citations to other researchers suggest, each of us has incurred debts that extend not only to those who attended the conference but to scholars and friends throughout the law and society
field.

